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Abstract
The traditional view of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is to see renunciation from the 
will-to-life as the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours in which suffering is 
tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed. In this view, Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, 
which he encapsulates in On the Basis of Morality in the principle “Harm no one; rather 
help everyone to the extent that you can” is a second best way of living, valuable only as 
a step along the path to “salvation” from the will-to-life in complete renunciation. In this 
paper, we suggest that this traditional picture of the ethics of compassion as ultimately 
a way station to the normatively preferable option of renunciation masks a fundamental 
conflict at the heart of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought. Instead, we argue, Schopenhauer 
should be interpreted as offering two independent, mutually antagonistic ethical ideals: 
compassion and renunciation. Bracketing Schopenhauer’s resignationism, we then pursue 
his ideal of compassion and offer a reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s ethics that espouses 
‘degrees of inherent value’ among living beings. We aim to show that on this reconstruc-
tion, Schopenhauer offers a hybrid Kantian/moral sense theory of ethics that has consider-
able novelty and philosophical attractions for contemporary ethical theorizing. 
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Resum. Compassió o renúncia? Aquesta és la qüestió de l’ètica de Schopenhauer
La visió tradicional del pensament ètic de Schopenhauer és veure la renúncia de la volun-
tat-de-viure com la resposta més vertadera i més ètica a un món com el nostre, en què 
el patiment és enorme, endèmic i no redimit. Des d’aquesta perspectiva, l’ètica de la 
compassió, que a Sobre el fonament de la moral Schopenhauer resumeix en el principi «No 
facis mal a ningú sinó més aviat ajuda a tothom en la mesura que puguis», és la segona 
millor forma de viure, valuosa tan sols com un pas en el camí vers «salvar-se» de la volun-
tat-de-viure mitjançant la renúncia completa. En aquest treball suggerim que aquesta 
imatge tradicional de l’ètica de la compassió com una estació de pas en el camí vers l’opció 
normativament preferible de la renúncia amaga un conflicte fonamental al cor del pensament 
ètic de Schopenhauer. En el seu lloc, argumentem que Schopenhauer ha d’interpretar-se en 
tant que ofereix dos ideals independents i mútuament antagònics de l’ètica: la compassió 
i la renúncia. Després, posant el «resignacionisme» de Schopenhauer entre parèntesis, 
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explorem el seu ideal de compassió i oferim una reconstrucció de l’ètica de Schopenhauer 
que defensa l’existència de «graus de valor inherent» entre els éssers vius. El nostre objectiu 
és demostrar amb aquesta reconstrucció que Schopenhauer ofereix una combinació d’ètica 
kantiana i ètica del sentit moral que té una considerable originalitat i resulta atractiva des 
del punt de vista de la teorització ètica contemporània.
Paraules clau: Schopenhauer; ètica; pessimisme; compassió; Kant.
1. Renunciation and compassion? Stating the conflict
The traditional view of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought is to see renunciation 
from the will-to-life as the truest, most ethical response to a world such as ours 
in which suffering is tremendous, endemic, and unredeemed1. In this view, 
Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion, which he encapsulates in his On the Basis 
of Morality (hereafter OBM) in the principle “Harm no one; rather help every-
one to the extent that you can [Neminem laede; imo omnes, quantum potes, iuva]” 
(OBM: 140) is a second best way of living, valuable only as a step along the 
path to “salvation” from the will-to-life in complete renunciation. Those saint-
ly few who can resign themselves from willing thus embody the highest wis-
dom and take the normatively preferred course; but for those of us who cannot 
or will not be saints, acting out of genuine compassion expresses some degree 
of wisdom and is the morally next best course of action. 
Christopher Janaway sums up the “instrumental view” of the morality of 
compassion as follows:
The person who is so morally good that the distinction between him- or 
herself and others begins to fall away, feels all the suffering throughout the 
world as if it were his or her own. This leads to resignation, brought about by 
sedation of the will or its recoil away from life. One grasps the utter lack of 
value in living and willing as an individual at all. Only by undergoing such 
an extreme redemptive transformation in consciousness, an extinction of the 
1. For a good statement of the traditional view see, Robert Wicks (2008: 127-8): “Resignation 
from worldly affairs, Schopenhauer believes, is the enlightened moral reaction to realizing 
that owing to one’s very presence, the world is filled with suffering, and that the practical 
and theoretical sides of our being involve pain ... [and that even] moral awareness […] 
involves suffering”.
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personality that consists in the cessation or self-negation of willing, can the 
individual’s existence attain genuine worth; and morality has value ultimately, 
not in its own right, but as a step towards this self-denial of the will. (2009a: 
xxxviii; emphasis added).
There is a great deal of textual support for this reading of the secondary, 
instrumental importance of Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion within his 
system. In chapter 48 of The World as Will and Representation: Volume II (here-
after WWR II), for instance, he describes the moral virtues—justice [Gerech-
tigkeit] and philanthropy [Menschenliebe]—as a “means of advancing self-
renunciation, and accordingly of denying the will-to-live” (WWR II: 606). He 
also applauds early Christianity for its recognition that “moral virtues are not 
really the ultimate end, but only a step towards it” (WWR II: 608). Further-
more, Schopenhauer describes the psychological transition from compassion 
to renunciation that he thinks is bound to take place in a person who truly 
exercises the moral virtue of justice: 
true righteousness, inviolable justice […] is so heavy a task, that whoever 
professes it unconditionally and from the bottom of his heart has to make 
sacrifices which soon deprive life of the sweetness required to make it enjoyable 
[…] and thus lead to resignation. (WWR II: 606).
Similarly, the virtue of Menschenliebe when seriously exercised leads “even more 
quickly” to resignation because “a person [who] takes over also the sufferings 
that originally fall to the lot of others” takes on a “hard lot”, and consequently 
“clinging to life and its pleasures must now soon yield, and make way for a 
universal renunciation […] [and] denial of the will” (WWR II: 606-7).
Two reasons emerge from these passages for the almost inevitable transition 
from moral virtue to renunciation. First, the task of genuine justice and phi-
lanthropy will come to seem rather futile – a local, minute decrease in an 
endless ocean of suffering. Second, serious exercise of these virtues is such as 
to divest one of the pleasures she takes in her own life, leading to greater 
detachment from her own will-to-life. 
Although there is much textual support for this instrumental view of Scho-
penhauer’s ethics, some of its entailments create tensions within his thought 
approaching the level of paradox. One tension lies in the fact that notwith-
standing the normative priority of renunciation over compassion, the ethics of 
compassion is still proclaimed as an ethical ideal in its own right, normatively 
to be preferred to egoism or malice. But as we shall detail below, when looked 
at in light of Schopenhauer’s espousal of renunciation, compassion—unlike 
egoism and malice—actually works in a manner that is antagonistic to the ideal 
of renunciation; and the ideal of renunciation works in a manner contrary to 
the ideal of compassion. 
What we would like to suggest in this paper, is that the traditional picture 
of the ethics of compassion as a step in the right direction, but ultimately a 
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way-station to the normatively preferable option of renunciation, masks a fun-
damental conflict at the heart of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought. Rather, we sug-
gest that Schopenhauer should be interpreted as offering two independent, 
mutually antagonistic ethical ideals: compassion and renunciation. Further-
more, which ideal is preferable within Schopenhauer’s system depends on the 
grounds on offer for hope that suffering in the world may be significantly 
diminished—in other words, whether or not hope is reasonable is the fulcrum 
on which this decision should be based.
2. Schopenhauer’s ethical principle
There are actually two fundamental tensions within Schopenhauer’s ethical 
thought that have gone largely unnoticed by commentators. The first lies 
between the two distinct parts of Schopenhauer’s ethical principle: “Harm no 
one; rather help everyone to the extent that you can”, and the second lies in 
Schopenhauer’s claim that compassionate action—understood as preventing 
or alleviating the suffering of others—is actually beneficial to the recipients of 
compassionate action. We will address these tensions in turn.
Schopenhauer’s ethical principle does not function within his system in the 
same way that the Categorical Imperative does in Kant’s. The principle is not 
the source or foundation of morality, but rather is simply a reservoir for that 
source or foundation which is the feeling of compassion. Nonetheless, the prin-
ciple encapsulates the maxim of a morally good person (OBM: 205), and 
having such a principle is “indispensable for a moral life, as the container […] 
in which the disposition that has risen out of the source of all morality, which 
does not flow at every moment, is stored so that it can flow down through 
supply channels when a case for application comes” (OBM: 205). Thus, Scho-
penhauer’s principle is not imperatival in form and force; rather, the morally 
good person is, as a matter of empirical fact, motivated by compassion to harm 
no one; rather to help everyone to the extent that she or he can.
 Living in accordance with this principle is nonetheless extremely demand-
ing given the nature of organic existence. In Schopenhauer’s proto-Darwinian 
view, organisms are essentially driven by the will-to-life, which he believes 
necessarily involves competition with other living beings for the basic means 
to sustain life and propagate the species. This competition brings tremendous 
suffering to the self and others in its wake. In a famous passage, Schopen-
hauer comments on this Darwinian struggle for existence:
[…] in Java he [Junghuhn] saw an immense field entirely covered with skel-
etons, and took it to be a battlefield. However, they were nothing but skeletons 
of large turtles […]. These turtles come this way from the sea, in order to 
lay their eggs, and are then seized upon by wild dogs […] with their united 
strength, these dogs lay them on their backs, tear open their lower armour, 
the small scales of their belly, and devour them alive. But then a tiger often 
pounces on the dogs. Now all this misery is repeated thousands and thousands 
of times, year in year out. For this, then, are these turtles born. For what offence 
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must they suffer this agony? What is the point of this whole scene of horror? The 
only answer is that the will-to-live thus objectifies itself. (WWR II: 354; emphasis 
added)
In the human world as well, ordinary relationships result in tremendous 
suffering. This is illuminated well for Schopenhauer through bourgeois trag-
edies in which “morally ordinary characters in everyday circumstances are posi-
tioned with respect to each other in such a way that their situation forces them 
knowingly and clear-sightedly to cause each other the greatest harm without 
the injustice falling on one side or the other” (The World as Will and Represen-
tation: Volume I, hereafter WWR I: 281-2). Given Schopenhauer’s view of the 
affirmation of the will-to-life as inevitably causing harm and suffering to oth-
ers in the animal and human world alike, the injunction to “harm no one” is 
impossible to respect insofar as one continues to participate in the will-to-life at 
all. Thus, it seems that the only way to strictly live up to the “harm no one” 
part of the principle is to give up willing altogether through renunciation. 
But what of the other half of the principle: “help everyone to the extent that 
you can”? This second part is decidedly not served by renunciation, for the truly 
resigned person no longer actively helps anyone. Schopenhauer describes the 
transition from moral virtue to ascetic renunciation as one from “loving others 
as himself and doing as much for them as for himself” to having a “loathing for 
the essence that is expressed as his own appearance, the will-to-life […]” (WWR 
I: 407). Consequently, the person on the way to achieving salvation is “careful 
not to let his will attach itself to anything, and tries to steel himself with the 
greatest indifference toward all things” (WWR I: 407); and for the fully resigned 
person “this world of ours which is so very real with all its suns and galaxies 
is—nothing.” (WWR I: 439). The resigned Saint seems to have achieved an 
existence that is beyond all caring and ipso facto beyond all compassion.
However, it is caring for others—and, more particularly, the action moti-
vated by such caring—that is called for by the second half of the moral prin-
ciple. It would seem, then, that renunciation is opposed to the second part of 
the moral principle. Compassionate affirmation of the will-to-life, while non-
egoistic, is clearly non-resignationist as well. 
The result of this analysis therefore uncovers a dilemma within Schopen-
hauer’s ethical principle. On the one hand, in order to fully honor the “harm 
no one” part of the principle, resignation is required. But, on the other hand, 
if one resigns, one is thereby not “helping everyone to the extent that one can.” 
It appears as though we cannot simultaneously honor both parts of the prin-
ciple – and this despite the fact that its wording would appear to imply that 
we can. Schopenhauer never acknowledges this dilemma. As it stands, then, 
Schopenhauer’s ethics requires that we choose between two mutually exclusive 
parts of an ethical principle. And what is more, choosing either entails violat-
ing the other! 
To complicate matters further for the standard view, there is a second major 
tension within Schopenhauer’s ethical thought represented by his notion that 
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compassionate action—understood as preventing or alleviating the suffering 
of others—actually benefits others. Schopenhauer describes the virtue of justice 
as preventing a person from causing suffering to others—and therefore, refrain-
ing from harming them—and the virtue of loving-kindness/philanthropy 
[Menschenliebe] as moving a person actively to sacrifice something (one’s time, 
bodily or mental exertions, wealth, health, freedom, or even one’s life 
[cf. OBM: 216]) in order to help alleviate another’s suffering or prospective 
suffering. These virtues therefore clearly aim at the good of others in the form 
of prevention of or lessened suffering. And they are virtues rather than vices 
precisely because they do so. But can preventing or lessening another’s suffer-
ing be consistently construed as a good for the recipient of compassion within 
Schopenhauer’s system?
In chapter 49 of WWR II, titled “The Road to Salvation”, Schopenhauer 
elaborates the two paths to negation of the will-to-life he set out in WWR I. 
These paths involve recognizing the essential, irredeemable suffering of exist-
ence that is cognized, on the one hand, from the cases of others, or, on the 
other, from “one’s own immediate feeling of suffering” (WWR I: 424). In this 
supplementary chapter, Schopenhauer stresses that very few people will achieve 
salvation along the first path and that it is personal suffering that has the great-
est promise as a “sanctifying force” (WWR II: 636):
The [first] way, leading to just the same goal [renunciation] by means of mere 
knowledge and accordingly the appropriation of the sufferings of a whole 
world, is the narrow path of the elect, of the saints, and consequently is to be 
regarded as a rare exception. Therefore, without that [path of personal suffer-
ing] it would be impossible for the majority to hope for any salvation. But 
we struggle against entering this path, and strive rather with all our might to 
prepare for ourselves a secure and pleasant existence, whereby we chain our 
will ever more firmly to life. (WWR II: 638) 
Given that the majority of us have no hope of reaching salvation—which 
is the highest good—without personal suffering, it seems that compassionate 
measures taken by others to prevent or alleviate our suffering may not be in 
our truly best interests after all! If one takes a narrow view of things, compas-
sionate action may appear beneficial; but in the broad view, this is precisely 
the sort of action that will help to “chain our will ever more firmly to life”, 
thereby leading us away from the possibility of salvation2. Now, it could be 
2. We should acknowledge a possible resolution of the second dilemma described, i.e. that one 
cannot honor the ideal of renunciation without ipso actu running contrary to the ideal of 
compassion. One might argue that the ideal of renunciation serves the ideal of compassion 
by providing the sufferer with proof that one can be freed of the pains of the will-to-life. 
The great ascetics reveal that the dominion of the will-to-life is not total. But this solution 
threatens to make Schopenhauer’s extension of compassion to non-human animals, who 
are incapable of renunciation, mysterious. What makes a being ethically considerable for 
Schopenhauer is, it seems, not sapience but sentience. Thus, we shall devote no further 
attention here to the compassion-via-modeling-saintly-renunciation solution. We address 
the moral considerability of sentient beings below in §§IV and V.
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that the person one is aiming to help through compassionate action could not 
attain salvation, and in this case, the action would actually be beneficial. So 
the problem here is a kind of epistemic paradox: how does one know that the 
person one “helps” through compassionate action is not thereby being hindered 
on his or her path to salvation?3 
Now, this epistemic paradox of the beneficial-yet-for-that-reason-poten-
tially-harmful aspect of compassion is limited to actions directed at beings 
who are capable of salvation – that is to say, rational beings. Compassionate 
actions are unproblematically beneficial to non-human animals who are inca-
pable of salvation (either though the renunciation of the will-to-life by per-
sonal suffering or by an understanding of the suffering of others). In the case 
of rational animals, however, the problem is that the compassionate actions 
that reduce the suffering of such beings also stand to diminish their progress 
toward salvation. In light of Schopenhauer’s commitment to the normative 
primacy of renunciation, it would seem that egoistic or malicious actions 
could ironically be more beneficial to other rational beings inasmuch as they 
would ratchet up their suffering, thereby leading them—potentially—to 
unchain their will-to-life, and thus, further along the path toward salvation. 
Thus, the standard picture of a continuum of morally worthy options cul-
minating in renunciation masks the fact that compassion and renunciation 
seem upon closer investigation to be mutually exclusive ethical ideals. If our 
analysis is correct, instead of an unproblematic hierarchy between morally-
worthy ways of being—one which tends psychologically, logically and ethi-
cally to lead to the other—Schopenhauer’s ethical system confronts a person 
with a choice between which of two fundamentally incompatible ideals one 
should honor. 
3. Compassion or renunciation?
In order to see if we might yet find greater unity between Schopenhauer’s eth-
ics of compassion and his doctrine of renunciation, we might try to resolve the 
dilemma confronting us by imposing a lexical ordering on Schopenhauer’s 
ethical principle. And there is some evidence in the text of OBM that he sees 
the first part of the principle, “harm no one”, as more important than the 
second, “help everyone to the extent that one can”, inasmuch as he claims that 
justice is “the first and the fundamentally essential cardinal virtue” (OBM: 
215). So we might construe his ethics of compassion as ranking the parts of 
the principle thusly:
(1) Harm no one;
(2) Help everyone to the extent that you can. 
3. We are grateful to Allen Wood for pointing out that the paradox is really an epistemic one.
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Given the way in which Schopenhauer phrases and discusses his ethical 
principle, we might take him to hold in a similar fashion to Rawls’ lexical 
ordering of the two principles of justice, that it is at least possible simultane-
ously to respect both component principles of his fundamental principle of 
morality4.
However, given Schopenhauer’s pessimism concerning the will-to-life—and 
particularly, the notion that it is essential to any affirmation of the will that 
harm be done to others—it would seem that these principles cannot be simul-
taneously respected. One needs to violate at least to some extent the “harm no 
one” principle in order to satisfy “help everyone to the extent that you can” 
and vice versa. What results from this lexical priority, though, is that the con-
flict can be rationally adjudicated by honoring the first principle and sacrific-
ing the second through renunciation. This outcome also implicitly acknowl-
edges the illusoriness of “benefitting” other human beings through preventing 
or alleviating their suffering, insofar as it may be counter-productive for their 
highest good or salvation.
By this line of reasoning, however, egoistic or even malicious actions to 
human beings may be ethically preferable to just or philanthropic actions, for 
these would better stand to help other human beings attain salvation by ratch-
eting up their suffering. Yet, Schopenhauer clearly decries rampant egoism, 
injustice, and malice, and argues that compassionate action constitutes objec-
tively, morally praiseworthy action insofar as it embodies greater metaphysical 
insight than the other two attitudes. So it seems that the lexical ordering strat-
egy will not save Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion from conflict with his 
doctrine of renunciation after all. 
We suggest that a more promising approach to these difficulties can be 
found especially, but not exclusively, in his (non-)prize-winning essay OBM 
where Schopenhauer develops the ethics of compassion by bracketing his doc-
trine of pessimism and assumes that some significant progress toward a world 
with less suffering is possible5. In this work, wherein he was forced by the 
strictures of the prize competition to write ‘incognito,’ Schopenhauer actually 
strikes a hopeful tone, and endorses individual and institutional action to 
promote justice and alleviate suffering. In fact, there are many passages in this 
essay where he cites measures that had greatly alleviated suffering. The British 
nation comes in for special praise in this regard for having spent “up to 20 
million pounds sterling to buy the negro slaves in its colonies their freedom” 
(OBM: 218), and for their animal protection societies which introduced leg-
4. We are grateful to Kyla Ebels-Duggan for suggesting this lexical-ordering solution as a 
potential way to resolve the paradox.
5. There are places in WWR I and II as well, however, where Schopenhauer strikes a more 
hopeful tone. See for instance his remarks on how improvements in a State could eliminate 
“all kinds of evil to bring about something approaching a utopia” though “there would 
still exist countless evils that are absolutely essential to life” (WWR I: 376). A bit later on 
Schopenhauer admits that it is “conceivable that all crime could be prevented by a perfect 
state […]” (WWR I: 396).
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islation criminalizing the cruel treatment of non-human animals. In a dis-
tinctly non-resignationist tone, Schopenhauer even dedicates his citation of 
newspaper reports detailing the criminalization of animal cruelty to “the asso-
ciations against the torture of animals now established in Germany, so that 
they see how one must attack the issue if anything is to come of it” and he 
praises Councilor Perner in Munich who has spread the animal protection 
initiative “throughout the whole of Germany” (OBM: 230, note). 
The question we shall now investigate, then, is whether this compassionate 
strand of Schopenhauer’s ethical thought may be rescued from the fundamen-
tal dilemmas that arise given his doctrine of pessimism and renunciation.
4. Inherent value 
In his Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche’s Genealogy, Christopher Janaway 
quite rightly characterizes the basic motivating idea of Schopenhauer’s ethics 
of compassion as the “essential parity of all beings who strive and suffer” inso-
far as they “share a single common essence or inner nature” (2009b: 61). 
Janaway suggests that this essential parity may be interpreted in two ways: first, 
in a substantively metaphysical way, i.e. as holding that individuation is tran-
scendentally ideal and that the common essence of all phenomena is the met-
aphysical will; and second, in an axiological way, i.e. as a claim that “there is 
nothing of any fundamental importance about the individual that I am” such 
that, from a universal moral standpoint, “it is a matter of indifference wheth-
er my ends are promoted and the other’s thwarted, or vice versa” (Janaway 
2009b: 62). Although Schopenhauer certainly develops the metaphysical inter-
pretation of the “essential parity of all beings who strive and suffer” in the final 
section of OBM and in WWR I & II, there are also textual grounds for holding 
the axiological interpretation (though, as we shall detail below, even the axi-
ological interpretation involves a metaphysical commitment). 
In pursuing the axiological interpretation, Janaway understands this essen-
tial parity as consisting in the fact that, from the universal moral standpoint, 
no one is any more or less worthy of suffering than any other being because, 
from that ultimate standpoint, we are all worthless (or are nothing – see WWR 
I: 439). Taking into consideration Schopenhauer’s ultimate embrace of renun-
ciation as embodying the highest wisdom, this is a reasonable interpretation. 
But this interpretation invites the aforementioned paradoxes that threaten to 
undermine the normativity of compassion over egoism and malice. 
If this pessimistic, resignationist strand of Schopenhauer’s thought is brack-
eted for the time being, however, then another interpretation of this essential 
parity of striving beings emerges. According to this interpretation, all sentient 
beings—that is, all beings capable of pain and pleasure—have positive, inher-
ent value. In this view, it is a parity of the intrinsic worth of all beings capable 
of suffering, rather than a parity of the intrinsic worthlessness of all beings, that 
gives content to the claim that another’s ends are prima facie on a level with 
one’s own. This is because suffering is the experience of deprivation of one’s 
60  Enrahonar 55, 2015 Sandra Shapshay; Tristan Ferrell
(expected) good; and that which has a good has, we understand, pro tanto 
inherent value and thus moral considerability.
Support for our interpretation against that of Janaway can be found in the 
context of Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s Formula of Humanity of the Cat-
egorical Imperative insofar as it has—Schopenhauer claims—deeply counter-
intuitive implications for the putative moral considerability of non-human 
animals. In section 8 of OBM, Schopenhauer is critical of Kant’s describing 
persons as “ends in themselves”, and thereby having “dignity beyond all price” 
for Schopenhauer claims that an “end” properly refers only to the goal or aim 
of willing rather than to the being who does the willing. He also objects to the 
terminology that human beings have “absolute worth” (OBM: 161), as he 
maintains that “worth” is a comparative term, and thus, that there is no con-
tent that can be given to the notion of “absolute” worth, just as there can be 
no content given to notions of the “highest” number or the “largest” space. 
The crux of Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, then, 
is his undermining of the sharp moral distinction between human and non-
human animals: Schopenhauer does not believe that the ability to set one’s 
own ends rationally endows a being with an incommensurable value—a “dig-
nity beyond all price”.
It might seem, however, that in criticizing Kant’s Formula of Humanity, 
Schopenhauer jettisons the view that anything has inherent value. As alluded 
to above, this is how Janaway reads him—namely, that everything at bottom 
is worthless—and Bernard Reginster also holds that Schopenhauer rejects any 
notion of intrinsic goodness. So, it might seem that our favored interpreta-
tion—which places the moral considerability of all striving and suffering 
beings on their positive inherent value—cannot be tenable given Schopen-
hauer’s other commitments in the metaphysics of value6.
6. Reginster claims on the basis of WWR I, §65, p. 387 that Schopenhauer rejects the notion 
of intrinsic value. He adduces the following passage in support: “we call everything good 
that is just as we want it to be” (see Reginster 2013: 162; cf. Reginster 2006: 98-99, 
173-174). Reginster glosses this assertion as something’s agreeing with some desire of ours 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for our calling it good, and thus goodness must be 
relative to someone’s desires, and thus, there cannot be intrinsic goodness according to 
Schopenhauer. But this interpretation fares badly when the passage is read in context, 
for Schopenhauer is considering the conditions upon which we call something good, not 
as such the conditions in virtue of which something is good. This can be seen in the fact 
that Schopenhauer is explicit in §65 that his subject matter is “[what] is intended in [or 
what is the content of ] the concept of good” (387; emphasis original). The concept of good 
is – as are all concepts for Schopenhauer – an abstract representation, or a higher-order 
representation of intuitive representations (cf. WWR I, §9). But, for Schopenhauer, “true 
virtue does not arise from abstract cognition in general, but must come from intuitive 
cognition that recognizes in another individual the same essence as in its own” (394; 
emphasis original). We take it that compassionate action is a form of true virtue for 
Schopenhauer, if not the form of true virtue, and consists in recognition of the inherent 
value in another. Since true virtue does not consist in the application of concepts to objects 
in judgments, e.g. “x is good”, but is rather an intuitive grasping of “the same essence 
[in another’s as one’s own” (cf. OBM, §12: 181), we should not read Schopenhauer’s 
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But Schopenhauer can hold that human and non-human animals have 
positive inherent value without having absolute value or “dignity beyond all 
price”. And Schopenhauer utilizes the idea of inherent value for human beings 
and non-human animals in several passages regarding the kind of treatment 
owed to these beings. In a passage in which Schopenhauer chides Kant (and 
Western theological ethics generally) for his lack of regard for non-human 
animals, he writes:
Bah! What a morals of pariahs, chandalas, and mlechchas—which fail to rec-
ognize the eternal essence [das ewige Wesen] that is present in everything that 
has life [in Allem, was Leben hat], and that shines out with unfathomable 
significance [unergründlicher Bedeutsamkeit] from all eyes that see the light of 
the sun. (OBM: 162)
Here Schopenhauer espouses not the equal worthlessness of “everything that 
has life”, but rather their equal inherent value, which he describes as the 
“unfathomable significance” [unergründlicher Bedeutsamkeit] of all living 
beings. This significance “shines out” from “all eyes that see the light of the 
sun”; thus, presumably, the significance can be directly perceived in and by 
the many sentient animals with whom we interact, such as horses, dogs, cats, 
cows, sheep, etc. From this passage, then, it seems that Schopenhauer does not 
object to Kant’s recognition of the inherent value of human beings as such, 
but rather to his calling it “absolute worth”, and to his seeing only human 
beings as inherently valuable. 
Another passage that supports our interpretation comes again from Scho-
penhauer’s discussion of what he sees as the bias against non-human animals 
in Western theological ethics:
European priestliness […] in its profanity thinks it cannot go far enough in 
its denial and defamation of the eternal essence [des ewigen Wesens] that lives 
in all animals; whereby it has laid down the basis for the hardness and cruelty 
to animals that is customary in Europe. (OBM: 227; emphasis added)
What European theological ethics has “denied” and “defamed” seems not 
to be the parity of the worthlessness of all living beings—after all, it makes 
little sense to say that worthlessness can be “defamed”—but precisely the par-
ity of their inherent value obtaining by virtue of the “eternal essence” living 
in all of them. 
In these passages Schopenhauer seems to appeal to an inherent value of all 
sentient beings that is comparative—rather than absolute—and thus may 
come in degrees. His key point against Kant is that it is not the possession of 
statement in §65 cited by Reginster as concerning true virtue. Instead, his claim in §65 
is meant to characterize a deficient, egoistic form of morality, viz. a “morality without 
grounding, which is to say mere moralizing” (§66: 394). Thus, there seems to be no good 
reason to take Schopenhauer’s discussion in WWR I, sections 65 & 66 as implying a 
rejection of any notion of intrinsic value.
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reason which endows a being with inherent value, thereby making that being 
morally considerable and even a holder of rights; instead, it is sentience that 
makes one morally considerable. In what follows, we shall return to the all-
important question of exactly which characteristics one must have to be mor-
ally considerable in Schopenhauer’s view. Since it is in virtue of the “eternal 
essence”—which seems most naturally understood as the metaphysical will—
that beings are endowed with “unfathomable significance”, this provides a 
clue as to what comprises the possession of positive inherent value. The 
details of this account, however, must be pieced together from various pas-
sages. From the passages we have adduced thus far it is unclear, for example, 
whether all living beings should be understood as morally considerable or 
perhaps only the subset of living beings who are sentient, or even something 
narrower still, such as a being that is the “subject of a life”, to borrow a phrase 
from Tom Regan.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the scope of compassion, the 
compassionate outlook is clearly normatively preferable to the egoistic or mali-
cious outlook for Schopenhauer. His reasoning can be explained as follows: 
first, those beings with cognition—sentient beings who possess intuitive 
knowledge—are “bearers of a world” (WWR I: 358), and from an egoistic 
perspective, each cognizing individual feels as though he or she is “a micro-
cosm equal in value to the macrocosm [the entire world]” (WWR I: 358). 
What the compassionate person recognizes intuitively—contrary to the ego-
ist—is that another individual has the same essence as herself, and ipso facto, 
the value of the other’s microcosm is equivalent to her own, and both are 
equivalent to the macrocosm. In other words, Schopenhauer’s explanation for 
the moral objectivity and normativity of the attitude of compassion is that 
other sentient beings matter morally speaking in exactly the same way as one’s 
own microcosm matters—the inherent value of all of these microcosms is 
(roughly) on a par. One only seems truly to recognize this moral fact, how-
ever, via intuitive knowledge—the knowledge of feeling—rather than through 
abstract reasoning.
Schopenhauer’s view on the normativity of compassion should not be 
construed along the lines of the Classical Utilitarian who maintains that the 
only things that matter intrinsically are pleasure and pain; on the contrary, 
Schopenhauer holds that sentient beings themselves—qua microcosms—mat-
ter and that these sentient beings themselves have “unfathomable significance”. 
Indeed, it is precisely because these beings have unfathomable significance 
that their pleasure or pain matters. This positive inherent value of (at least) 
sentient subjects also explains why the clearest expression of the fundamental 
principle of ethics is for Schopenhauer “Harm no one; rather, help everyone 
to the extent that you can”. If Schopenhauer held that the sole intrinsic good 
were pleasure and/or lack of pain and suffering, then the first part of the 
principle “harm no one”—a principle that respects the separateness of per-
sons—would not be stressed as it is in Schopenhauer’s ethics. Insofar as harm-
ing some brings about far less suffering and far more pleasure for everyone 
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else, then, all things considered, the Classical Utilitarian must endorse it7. 
This is not Schopenhauer’s view. He understands the ethics of compassion as 
enjoining us to harm no one even if doing so would bring about better con-
sequences all things considered.
5. What kind of moral theory does Schopenhauer provide?
In this reconstruction where we have bracketed Schopenhauer’s pessimism and 
espousal of renunciation, Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion offers a hybrid 
Kantian-Moral Sense theory of ethics. In a Kantian vein, the feeling of com-
passion is normative, for Schopenhauer, because it tracks the inherent value of 
sentient beings, and the feelings of egoism and malice are non-normative 
because they fail to track the roughly equal inherent value of all potentially 
suffering beings. In saying this we do not ignore his significant departures from 
Kant’s ethics. Schopenhauer rejects the imperatival form of ethics and ridicules 
the Categorical Imperative as the supreme principle of morality, although he 
retains his own formula of the supreme principle in “harm no one; rather help 
everyone to the extent that you can”. But in his ethics of compassion, it func-
tions only as a rule of thumb and, especially, as a reservoir for the feeling of 
compassion. Crucially, it is the feeling of compassion that is, pace Kant, the 
foundation of all actions with moral worth (OBM: 199). 
Nonetheless, we should note before pressing the differences further that it 
has largely gone unnoticed by commentators that Schopenhauer’s ethics of 
compassion actually retains other elements of the Kantian picture. For example, 
while Schopenhauer jettisons the notion of the absolute worth or “dignity 
beyond all price” of humanity, his ethics retains the intelligible/empirical char-
acter distinction, the possibility of individual freedom to change one’s own 
character (though the mechanism for this must remain mysterious), the useful 
role of moral principles, and most importantly, as we have argued, a commit-
ment to the inherent value of human beings, though, for Schopenhauer, it is 
qua living, striving, cognizing subject of a life at all—i.e., qua microcosm—
rather than qua rational being—that endows humans with that value.
Related to the crucial difference from Kant regarding the normative force 
of the feeling of compassion is Schopenhauer’s moral epistemology: according 
to Schopenhauer, the inherent value of living beings is known exclusively via 
intuitive knowledge (of which feeling is a species), rather than—in Kant’s 
view—through any empirical or synthetic a priori “fact of reason” (cf. WWR 
I: 394). With respect to his moral epistemology, then, it seems Schopenhauer 
comes closer to moral sense theorists insofar as the feeling of compassion is 
epistemically privileged over conceptually mediated cognition in his view. And 
while Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that even the simplest and least edu-
cated person can have a morally good character, he diverges from him with 
7. We are putting to one side, of course, sophisticated rule-utilitarian attempts to ground a 
view of rights as trumps in the principle of utility.
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respect to the reason for this. For Schopenhauer, even the simplest person can 
embody the highest ethical insight insofar as she is endowed with innate com-
passion, and through this feeling she tracks the “unfathomable significance” 
of other sentient subjects. Not perceiving this inherent value in another is the 
result of a person’s character being predominantly egoistic or malicious. 
To return to the issue of our axiological interpretation’s metaphysical com-
mitment alluded to toward the beginning of §IV, Schopenhauer expli- 
citly agrees with Kant that actions of moral worth have a metaphysical import. 
It is for this reason that, after a long empirical investigation of moral phe-
nomena in OBM, Schopenhauer believes he must turn to a “metaphysical 
explanation” in order to show that the person who acts out of compassion 
has gotten things objectively right, whereas egoistic and malicious agents have 
gotten them objectively wrong. The metaphysical reason he gives for why the 
compassionate person sees things aright, and the malicious and egoistic person 
sees things incorrectly, is that ultimately all sentient beings share the same met-
aphysical essence, and from the perspective of the world as will, the distinctions 
between us qua spatio-temporal beings are an illusion. Even though our axi-
ological interpretation does not rely on the notion of individuation as illusory 
from the perspective of the world as will, in the final analysis, then, our inter-
pretation of Schopenhauer’s claim regarding the essential parity of all sentient 
beings, namely, that they all share roughly equal inherent value, is, at the same 
time, a metaphysical one inasmuch as it involves an appeal to the objective 
moral fact of the matter. Thus, in our reconstruction, Schopenhauer’s ethics 
embraces moral realism—along the lines of Allen Wood’s interpretation of 
Kant’s ethics—but it widens the scope of the beings that have inherent value 
from rational beings to sentient subjects of lives, or “microcosms”.
So while there may be a rather large number of questions raised by our 
reconstruction, due to space restrictions we can only address one of them and 
this is the question of scope. Given that all beings, including even non-living 
beings such as rocks and pools of water, are for Schopenhauer at bottom 
‘Will’, it would seem that anything endowed with the “eternal essence” [ewi-
ges Wesen] would be morally considerable on this view. It is apparent from 
the above-cited passages, however, that the “unfathomable significance” which 
calls on our feelings of compassion and justice is had only by living beings 
– beings that manifest the will-to-life [Wille zum Leben]. Yet, even more 
specifically, Schopenhauer focuses on animals capable of feeling weal and woe 
– that is, sentient beings. Indeed, the passages quoted above rail against cru-
elty to non-human animals, with “eyes capable of seeing the light of the sun”. 
Specifically, the question that confronts us then is this: insofar as, say, plants 
(which do not appear sentient) and insects (which could be sentient but only 
to a very limited degree) manifest the will-to-life, should Schopenhauer have 
held that all living beings are endowed with inherent value and are thus mor-
ally considerable?
This is where Schopenhauer’s thought requires fairly heavy reconstruction. 
Nevertheless, we do think that he lends himself to a nuanced reconstruction in 
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terms of “degrees of inherent value” and corresponding degrees of moral con-
siderability. Schopenhauer’s system is in general characterized by degrees (e.g., 
he talks of grades of the manifestation of the metaphysical will captured by 
the doctrine of the Ideas; grades of insight into the metaphysical reality—in 
aesthetic experience, compassion and resignation—and these correspond to 
degrees of will-lessness). Kant’s ethical system, on the other hand, is in gen-
eral characterized in more either/or terms: there are persons who have absolute 
worth or mere things; there is action from duty or merely in accordance with 
duty, etc. To use a prosaic metaphor: Schopenhauer’s ethical system is a dim-
mer switch whereas Kant’s is a straight on/off switch. 
Because of the general tendency in Schopenhauer’s system toward a con-
tinuum of ‘degrees of x,’ it is natural to interpret him as holding this while all 
manifestations of the metaphysical will (i.e., everything in the phenomenal 
world) have some inherent value and that this value accounts for the funda-
mental parity of all beings that are part of the single “eternal essence”. This 
inherent value comes in degrees and ipso facto calls for different responses 
according to the relevant degree. Take the following as a rough sketch of a few 
of the pertinent gradations:
i. First and highest is the degree of value and moral considerability inherent 
to human beings by virtue of their individuality, transcendental freedom, 
and highest capacity for suffering. Schopenhauer does describe human 
beings as special within the animal kingdom for each “having the dignity 
of an Idea of [his or her] own” (WWR I: 251). 
ii. Second, and descending, is the degree of value inherent to sentient, cogniz-
ing subjects, that is, the non-human animals we might describe, after Tom 
Regan, as “experiencing subjects of a life”. These animals experience emo-
tions and have lives which matter to them (Regan, 2004).
iii. Finally, there are beings that are not conscious of themselves as experienc-
ing subjects of a life but that are still capable of suffering and of feeling 
pleasure.
We take it that these gradations exhaust the scale of morally considerable 
beings. Non-sentient living beings, however, such as plants, that are endowed 
with the will-to-life would not possess inherent value because they are non-
sentient. And rocks, soil and pools of water, even though they are manifesta-
tions of the metaphysical will in the axiological interpretation, do not have 
inherent value. Notwithstanding their lack of inherent or moral value, this 
does not mean that in this view plants and inorganic beings should not be 
given some kind of consideration as well, but the sort that seems most appro-
priate is aesthetic rather than moral. 
Although we cannot do it justice here, we might offer a brief sketch of how 
this distinction might be drawn in a principled way: beings that have feelings 
or representations of their own value are appropriately responded to compas-
sionately, and therefore, morally. Compassion constitutively involves one’s 
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feeling with/as the other. Plants, rocks and pools of water do not—presuma-
bly—have feelings. It is not the fact that sentient beings have or are instances 
of the will-to-life, then, that makes them morally considerable, but the fact that 
this will-to-life is something to/for them. That is, they have feelings and repre-
sentations concerning this life. The absence of such representations is sufficient 
to exclude a being from moral consideration. To sum up, we understand that 
Schopenhauer restricts the scope of moral consideration to beings that can 
care—in some measure—about their lives. Again, such care need not require 
rational self-consciousness. Thus, while every being may have aesthetic and/or 
instrumental value, only those beings who are capable of feeling concern for 
or care about their lives are the appropriate objects of our compassion. 
Indeed, Schopenhauer’s many passages on the rights of non-human animals 
and of their enjoined compassionate treatment by human beings, show that he 
maintains that all sentient beings should be given more than aesthetic consid-
eration. Moreover, they show that human beings—by virtue of their complex-
ity, individuality, and freedom, and by virtue of their intelligible character—are 
owed the highest degree of moral consideration, including even respect for their 
individuality and freedom. Accordingly, he describes all of the will’s manifesta-
tions as “[forming] a pyramid, of which the highest point is man” (WWR I: 28). 
But there is nothing in Schopenhauer’s writings to suggest that some human 
beings are worth more than others, and he has very harsh things to say about 
racist slave traders who take people, without right, from their homelands and 
away from their families. So it can be understood that Schopenhauer (unlike 
Nietzsche) puts all human beings on a par with respect to moral considerabil-
ity, due to the fact that all human beings share these basic features of individu-
ality, having an intelligible character, and transcendental freedom.8 
6. Degrees of inherent value
In conclusion, our axiological reconstruction of Schopenhauer’s ethics of com-
passion shows that his considered view should be that only sentient beings 
have inherent value. However, this value comes in degrees and propriety of 
response maps onto the relevant characteristics of the given being that deter-
mine its degree of value. All manifestations of will, it seems, are the proper 
objects of aesthetic consideration, and thus, of aesthetic respect. But sentient 
beings are the proper subjects not just of aesthetic consideration, but also of 
compassionate or moral consideration. And while human beings, due to their 
individuality, rationality and freedom are the subjects of a higher degree of 
moral consideration than less complex, non-human animals, we hold that 
there is no reason to think that Schopenhauer would maintain that the moral 
consideration owed to human beings is different in kind. 
A significant philosophical attraction of this reconstruction is that it pre-
sents a novel ethical-theoretical hybrid of Kantian and moral sense theories 
8. For Schopenhauer’s views on freedom see Neill and Shapshay (2013).
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of ethics, which should facilitate a less anthropocentric way of doing norma-
tive ethics and, we hope, a more intuitively appealing orientation for dealing 
with the complex ethical issues concerning the treatment of non-human ani-
mals and the environment. It is necessary to point out, however, that we have 
developed this interpretation of Schopenhauer’s ethics of compassion by 
bracketing his doctrines of thoroughgoing pessimism and renunciation. If we 
no longer bracket these issues, how do things stand with Schopenhauer’s 
ethics of compassion? The ethics of compassion is still, it would seem, in 
direct conflict with renunciation. As we have described the dialectic thus far, 
the question becomes which axiological interpretation of the essential parity 
of all beings is metaphysically justified: the universal inherent worth of sen-
tient beings (our positive ethics of compassion) or the universal inherent 
worthlessness of sentient beings (à la Janaway)?
In deciding the issue it is helpful to return to Schopenhauer’s discussion of 
the transition from moral virtue to religious asceticism:
If we compare life to a circular path made of red-hot coals with a few cool 
places, where we are forced to keep going around and around the circle, some-
one entrapped in delusion is comforted by the coolness of the place where he 
is standing […] But someone who has seen through the principium individu-
ationis and recognizes the essence of things in themselves, and thus the whole, 
is not susceptible to such comfort: he sees himself on all points of the circle 
simultaneously, and steps away […] Specifically, he is no longer satisfied with 
loving others as himself and doing as much for them as for himself; instead he 
has conceived a loathing for the essence that is expressed as his own appear-
ance, the will to life, the kernel and essence of that world he recognizes as a 
miserable place. (WWR I: 406-7). 
This transition is effected by one’s sickening recognition that the world itself 
is, ultimately, a miserable place, and not that the beings that inhabit this world 
are worthless. The efficient component of this recognition is that the world—
and, at bottom, the will-to-life as such—systematically frustrates and disre-
spects the inherent value of sentient beings. 
Recall the source of Schopenhauer’s disgust and outrage at the fate of Jun-
ghuhn’s turtles: “for what offence must they suffer this agony? What is the 
point of this whole scene of horror? The only answer is that the will-to-live 
thus objectifies itself” (WWR II: 354). What brings about his turn from hope-
ful compassion to hopeless renunciation is precisely not seeing everything as 
worthless, but rather seeing that the world is so configured as necessarily to 
torture, as it were, sentient beings. Indeed, it is precisely not that the turtles 
are seen as worthless, but rather that the order of the world is such that their 
value or worth goes unrecognized and they are forced to suffer unjustly (“for 
what offence must they suffer this agony?”). 
The truly nauseating, renunciation-inspiring thought is that the value of 
sentient beings is—and horrifically, forever and necessarily will be—system-
atically dishonored by the way the world is. Given this doctrine of pessimism, 
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there is no satisfactory way of adhering to ethical principles in this world. And 
given the impossibility of realizing ethical ideals, renunciation appears norma-
tively preferable to participating in this disgusting, futile and immoral tragic-
farce of a world. If, however, the grounds for pessimism are wanting; and if 
there is hope that some measure of progress might be made in preventing and 
alleviating suffering, a hope which is, we have urged, the perspective of OBM; 
then, assuming the universal inherent value of sentient beings, the norma-
tively preferable path is compassion. What is more, if the grounds for pessi-
mism are wanting, then it is renunciation that is immoral, wicked—demon-
ic—and not the world.
What results from this investigation, then, are two distinct and incompat-
ible but genuinely Schopenhauerian ethical perspectives: the ethics of compas-
sion emerges as normatively preferable insofar as there are grounds for hope, 
while the ethics of renunciation is normatively preferred insofar as things are, 
ultimately, hopeless. It is crucial, then, to the justification of the ethics of 
compassion that the grounds for Schopenhauer’s thoroughgoing pessimism 
be evaluated—a task which must be left for another paper. 
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